April Glaspie was the US Ambassador to Iraq in 1990, appointed in 1989. At the time of the first Gulf War, there was an uproar over what Ambassador Glaspie did or did not say in an infamous meeting with Saddam Hussein on July 25, 1990. A transcript of the meeting, provided by Iraq, said Glaspie told Hussein (emphasis mine),

GLASPIE: I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.

The uproar, then, centered on whether Glaspie gave Hussein a green light to invade Kuwait, saying the US would stay out of Arab affairs. In March 1991, she testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and on the basis of a cable she sent to Washington about the July 25, 1990 meeting, she was accused of misleading Congress. From the NY Times,

Leading Senators today accused the former United States Ambassador to Iraq of misleading Congress in March when she testified about a crucial meeting with President Saddam Hussein eight days before his forces invaded Kuwait. The Senators’ remarks came after they reviewed several secret cables, particularly one from the Ambassador, April C. Glaspie, summarizing the meeting. The cables were provided by the State Department to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week. …. Indeed, her summary of her conversation in one of the cables stated that she had “made clear that we can never excuse settlement of disputes by other than peaceful means.” But the cables do not show her having spoken of Kuwait’s “vital” relationship with the United States, and most of her remarks appeared to be aimed at mollifying the Iraqi leader.

And that indeed was the problem. The cable was classified at the time, but is now available at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation. You can read it here. Here is what the 8-page cable has to say on a US response to aggression in Kuwait:

AMBASSADOR RESUMED HER THEME, RECALLING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD INSTRUCTED HER TO BROADEN AND DEEPEN OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.
….
SHE WISHED TO USE HER LIMITED TIME WITH THE PRESIDENT TO STRESS FIRST PRESIDENT BUSH’S DESIRE FOR FRIENDSHIP AND, SECOND, HIS STRONG DESIRE, SHARED WE ASSUME BY IRAQ, FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN IRAQ. IS IT NOT REASONABLE FOR US TO BE CONCERNED WHEN THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER BOTH SAY PUBLICLY THAT KUWAITI ACTIONS ARE THE EQUIVALENT OF MILITARY AGGRESSION, AND THEN WE LEARN THAT MANY UNITS OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE BORDER? IS IT NOT REASONABLE FOR US TO ASK, IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP, NOT CONFRONTATION, THE SIMPLE QUESTION: WHAT ARE YOUR INTENTIONS?
….
THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT SHE HAD SERVED IN KUWAIT 20 YEARS BEFORE; THEN, AS NOW, WE TOOK NO POSITION ON THOSE ARAB AFFAIRS.

Her own cable does not provide a strong support for her defense that she delivered a tough message to Hussein. NY Times columnist Thomas Friedman defended her at the time:

The Bush Administration moved today to counter the impression that it callously left April C. Glaspie, the American Ambassador to Iraq, as a scapegoat for failing to prevent President Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The public explanation given by the State Department today was that it had known for seven months that an Iraqi transcript of a meeting between Ambassador Glaspie and President Hussein was inaccurate in parts, but did not correct the record because officials did not want to divert attention from organizing the anti-Iraqi coalition. The Iraqi transcript seemed to suggest that Ms. Glaspie was trying to appease Mr. Hussein. Some Administration officials said privately that the real reason that the record was not corrected was that the State Department was uncertain on the basis of Ms. Glaspie’s own cable from Baghdad about the July 25 meeting that she delivered as forceful a message to Mr. Hussein to stay out of Kuwait as she says she did.

Friedman also wrote,

“I told him orally we would defend our vital interests, we would support our friends in the Gulf, we would defend their sovereignty and integrity,” Ms. Glaspie said today. This, however, was omitted from the Iraqi account, she said. The Iraqi account of the meeting quotes Ms. Glaspie as having said to Mr. Hussein, “We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.” What the account omitted, Ms. Glaspie said, was the first half of that sentence, in which she said she emphasized several times “that we would insist on settlements being made in a nonviolent manner, not by threats, not by intimidation, and certainly not by aggression.”

A second cable, sent Jul 29, 1990, didn’t exactly reflect a snarling line in the sand stance either.

SECOND, WE HAVE DEFINED OUR NATIONAL INTEREST IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AS THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY. WE WANT THE OIL TO FLOW WITHOUT HINDRANCE, BUT WE HAVE NEVER TAKEN SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS ON INTRA-OPEC OR ARAB BORDER DISPUTES. IF WE MAINTAIN OUR TACTIC OF RELYING ON ARAB DIPLOMACY TO BRING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THIS NEWEST DISPUTE, AND I AGREE THIS IS OUR BEST BET, WE WILL HAVE RESOLUTELY TO SWALLOW OUR DISTASTE FOR THE IRAQI PROTECTION RACKET.

I bring this all up now because the London-based news outlet Dar Al Hayat as in interview with Ambassador Glaspie in which she reiterates her defense. Here is Part I of the interview, and here is Part II. Glaspie says,

Al Hayat: When you saw Saddam what was your conversation with him? Were you aware of the Iraqi troops massing along the border with Kuwait? Did the satellite monitor that?

A.G: Not only satellites but everybody in Iraq could see troops going to the south, trains for instance, we did not know exactly the number but we saw enough to understand as well as the Kuwaitis and everybody became deeply concerned. So Yes we all knew he was preparing for this. We had a visit from the Arab League Secretary General, an Egyptian envoy, many Arab envoys some of them came quietly; we did not know of them, everybody was concerned.

Al Hayat: Was He alone when he summoned you and you saw him? A.G: No Tarek Aziz was there and two or three of his aides to take notes. Al Hayat: Did he start talking directly to you?

A.G: Not quite direct, he started by telling me how very badly behaved the Kuwaitis were, referring also on the meetings in Jeddah that were held he was saying that they are unreasonable and blaming them. His whole accusation of the Kuwaitis made me concerned that the next thing he was going to say was going to take us backward 20 years when a previous Iraqi President said that Kuwait was a part of the southern wilayat of Iraq. It came to my mind that he was going to say so. So, although he had much more to say when he paused, I delivered my message.

Al Hayat: Bagdad then gave a version of your meeting with him saying you told him that the US government does not interfere in border disputes bewteen two Arab countries which he took as a green light form the Americans to attack Kuwait.

A.G: This version was invented by Tarek Aziz. After all Tarek was a master of words as a previous Minister of Information and editor of a newspaper. Obviously I did not give Saddam any such idea that we would not interfere in a border dispute what I did tell him was he must not interfere in Kuwait or anywhere else.
….
Al Hayat: Some sources in the State Department had mentioned that you had not received instruction and guidance from your government or from Secretary of State James Baker then?

A.G: No, that is not true. I received instruction that I carried out. I would say that the meeting in Washington of the Iraqi ambassador at the State Department was a week before I left and my instructions came from that meeting. I went to the Foreign Ministry I think five times and repeated the instruction not to do anything against Kuwait. About leaving I had asked a few weeks before if Icould leave, then when the situation became very threatening I thought as Saddam said to me and to President Mubarak that there would be no war that it would be a good chance to take my mother who was ill home and to consult with the Secretary of State and we had an important congressional visitor due to arrive and I thought I would be back in Bagdad within five days in time to be with this congressional visitor in the hope that Saddam would see him and he then could say it is not just the US government asking you not to invade Kuwait but also Congress, the American people were against him attacking Kuwait.

Unfortunately, as I said, Glaspie’s own cable isn’t the strongest Defense Exhibit A. She says the Iraqi transcript is inaccurate, but you can read through it, and read through Glaspie’s cable, and decide for yourself how closely matched the two are.

Whatever the truth of the matter, Hussein quickly found out the Western world would not stand for his invasion of Kuwait and his potential threat to Saudi oil fields. The US made two big blunders, though, in that adventure. It left Hussein in power, and it left the Shiites to be slaughtered by Hussein.

The news headlines today reflect the chain of consequences that ensued from those decisions.

(cross-posted at Peace Like A River)